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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v, : 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, : Case No. 860069 
Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Phillip Paul Larocco, appeals from a conviction 
and judgment imposed for one count of Theft of an Operable Motor 
Vehicle, a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-404 and §76-6-412 (1953 am amended) and one count of 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a Felony of the Third Degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 as amended). The Appel-
lant was found guilty by a jury after a trial which occurred on 
December 9 and 10, 1985. On January 10, 1986, the Appellant was 
sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of incarceration at 
the Utah State Prison of one to fifteen years for the second degree 
felony and zero to five years for the third degree felony. All 
proceedings occurred in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, 
Judge presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June of 1981 a 1973 Ford Mustang owned by William Padilla 
was stolen from his car lot, State Auto Sales, by a man who took 
the car for a test drive and never returned it. (R. 186). The sales-
man assisting the man was David Luce. (R. 18 6). The theft was 
reported to the police and Mr. Luce provided information about the 
thief the same day that the theft occurred. (R.202). Luce described 
the thief as a white male, approximately 5'8" to 5f10" tall and 
weighing approximately 160 to 165 lbs., and said that the thief 
resembled the actor Dom DeLuise. (R.202). The police did not arrest 
anyone at that time. 
Four years later, in May of 1985, David Luce, now a salesman at 
a different car lot, believed he saw the same man at the new lot. 
(R.190) He obtained information regarding the man and replayed that 
information to Padilla (R.192). Padilla subsequently went to the 
neighborhood where the man allegedly lived and spotted a 1973 Ford 
Mustang parked in front of the Defendant's residence. (R.215). That 
car was very similar to the car which was stolen from his lot in 1981. 
Padilla reported this information to the police. (R.215). Padilla 
did not see or speak to the defendant or anyone* else. (R.2L5) . 
Approximately two or three days later, Salt Lake County Detective 
Robison went to the defendant's address and saw a 1973 Ford Mustang 
parked in front of the defendant's house in the same place that 
Padilla reported seeing it several days earlier. (R. 231). She noted 
the license number of the car, its description, and the address, and 
left without further approaching the vehicle or the residence at that 
time. She conducted further investigation by running the plate number 
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and receiving back an associated VIN number (3F05H101968). A 
VIN search thorugh the Department of Motor Vehicles revealed 
that the car which was originally registered under such number, 
a 1973 Mach One Ford Mustang, was purchased new in 1973, by Neal 
Hailes of Salt Lake City, It was registered to Hailes through 
1975. The next registration entry for such VIN number was to the 
Defendant in 1981. (R.232-33). 
Approximately one week later, on June 6, 1985, Detective 
Robison, Salt Lake County Detective Owen, and Kip Ingersoll from 
the Department of Motor Vehicles went back to the Defendant's home 
and, again, the 1973 Ford Mustang was parked in front of the home. 
(R.234). The police looked through the windshield and saw 3F05H101968, 
vehicle identification number on the dashboard which did not match 
the VIN# of the vehicle taken from Padilla's lot four years previously. 
(R.235-36). The police then opened the door and entered the car with-
out a warrant. (See Stipulation of Facts submitted in connection with 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress on August 6, 1985; Addendum A). After 
opening the car door, the police found a different VIN, 3F05H164088, 
on the safety standard sticker located on the inside edge of the door 
(R.235). The VIN on the dashboard matched that of a vehicle pre-
viously owned by Mr. Neil Hailes (R.237). The VIN on the safety standard 
sticker matched that of the Ford Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales 
in 1981 (R.235). The police, at this point, approached the Defendant's 
residence and arrested him. 
At no time during Padilla's visit to look at the car or during 
Detective Robisonfs first visit to look at the car did either of them 
have any contact with the Defendant or anyone in his household; during 
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Detective Robison's second visit to the location on June 6, 1985, 
contact was made with the Defendant and other household members 
only after police had opened the car door (See Stipulation of 
Facts submitted in connection with Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
on August 6, 1985.) (R.15)(Addendum A). There was no indication 
that the Defendant was even aware that his car was being inspected 
or that he was a suspect up to the point where contact was made 
with him on June 6, 1985 (See Stipulation of Facts submitted in 
connection with Defendant's Motion to Suppress on August 6, 1985). 
(R.30-34) . 
Upon being contacted by the police on June 6, 1985, the Defendant 
told them he had purchased the car from Streator Chevrolet in 1981 
(R.239); the Defendant's brother-in-law also gave the police a Utah 
Certificate of Title showing a Ford Mustang with VIN 3F05H101968 
belonging to the Defendant (R.240-241). 
After impounding the vehicle, Kipp Ingersoll of the Division of 
Motor Vehicles located another shorter version of a VIN on the car's 
frame; this shorter VIN was similar to the VIN of the stolen Padilla 
Vehicle. (R.269-72). Mr. Ingersoll also discovered that the VIN tag 
on the dashboard had been glued on rather than riveted (VDI. II Tr.7-8); 
however, that dashboard VIN tag did not appear abnormal ii anyway upon 
Mr. Ingersoll's inspection of it from the exterior of the vehicle 
(R. 283). Subsequent investigation revealed that the VIN on the dash-
board tag matched a vehicle owned by Neil Hailes which was totally 
destroyed in a car accident in December of 1975 (R.233,253). 
Prior to the trial, Defendant filed a timely Motion to Suppress 
seeking to suppress evidence obtained by the police as a result of 
their warrantless search of the Defendant's vehicle on June 6, 1985; 
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that motion was denied by the trial court. (R.60). 
During the course of the trial, it came to the attention of the 
parties 1 the court that one of the jurors, Ms. Lembke, had a 
conversation with a prosecution witness, Neil Hailes, during a 
recess. (R, lb4) . The conversation was mostly general in nature 
It 4) hut- there was some conversation regarding the questions 
asked of the jury panel JII < dire (R.166). The witness, Neil 
Hailes, told the juror that he was suprised that ill jury panelists 
had indicate-) Uiat they would not give greater weight to the testimony 
of a police officer because tie himself would believe a police officer 
more than a lay witness (R.166)- Ms. Lembke stated that this conver-
sation with Mr. Hailes would not affect her deliberation in any way 
(R.168) The Defendant moved t a mistrial because of this conversa-
tion but the motion was denied (R.168-69). 
In I i^  requested jury instructions, the Defendant proposed that 
the trial court instruct the jur/ I hat Count II, Possession of a 
Stolen Vehicle, was a lesser included offense of Count T, Theft (of 
an operable motor vehicle); the requested instruction was denied, 
(R.324) and Instruction N< I n qiven despite the Defendant's objectio 
(R.324). The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts (R.325). 
After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court learned that 
two members of the jury had seen something which indicated that the 
Defendant was in custody at the time of trial. Juror Bragg told the 
court that she saw the Defendant being escorted down the stairs by a 
man wearing a suit (R.328); although the juror's statement does not 
directly reflect it, the Defendant was cleaiIj handcuffed. Juror 
Broadhead ^aw the Defendant being placed into a police car. (R.328-29). 
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Both jurors told the court that these observations did not have any 
influence on their determinations in the case. (R.329). 
On January 10, 1986, the Defendant made a timely Motion to 
Arrest Judgment based upon the juror's conversation with the prosecu-
tion witness and also upon the observations of the jurors that led 
them to realize the defendant was in custody. (R.104-05). That 
motion was denied. (R.345). 
The Defendant was sentenced by the court on January 10, 1986. 
The Defendant, having been convicted of both Theft (of an operable 
motor vehicle) and also Possession of a Stolen Vehicle argued that, 
under Section 76-1-402 Utah Code Annotated, he could only be sentenced 
once. (R.345-46). The court, however, chose to sentence on both 
charges - 0 to 5 years at the Utah State Prison on Count II, and 1 to 
15 years at the Utah State Prison on Count I to run concurrently. 
(R.349-50). 
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I 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The first argument presented on appeal conr* ins the discussion 
between tivo jurors and a prosecution witness during a trial recess. 
The trial court erred in not presuming prejudice and therefore erred 
in refusing to grant the Appellant's motion for mistrial. 
The second argument presented is that the search of the 
Appellant"* vehicle violated his federal and Utah Constitutional 
rights to be free from unreasonable searci tn«l loizurr, The appellant 
has standing to raise the issue because there was a bona-fide legal 
issue as to ownership of the car. The search was lacking probable cause 
because the vehicle identification number in pi im view of the police 
officers was registered to the Appellant. Even if there was probable 
cause, the wan anLless search of the vehicle did not come within any 
specific exceptions to the warrant requirement and was therefore un-
constitutional. The trial court erred in refusing to suppress the 
evidence obtained m the search. 
The third argument is that the Appellant f Light to a fair trial 
was prejudiced as a result of jurors seeing him in police custody on 
at least two occasiin^. The Appellant was prejudiced by the jurors' 
recognition of him as being incarcerated at thu time of trial. This 
viewing violated both the Appellant fs rights to a fair trial and 
his right to equal protection of the laws. 
The final argument is that the trial c • ' in instructing 
the jury that the Appellant could be convicted i i.*  t. h possession of 
a stolen vehicle aiul 1 ho theft of that same vehicle. The possession 
is encompassed by the theft, and therefoio, H i. error to enter judge-
ment against the Appellant under both statutes. Furthermore, the 
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Appellant was entitled to an instruction on possession of a stolen 
vehicle as a lesser included offense. The trial court erred in 
refusing to so instruct the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
AFTER A JUROR AND A PROSECUTION WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A 
RECESS. 
During the trial, the parties discovered that a prosecution 
witness, Neil Hailes, had conversed with a juror during a recess. 
(R.164). Part of the conversation was general in nature, but a 
portion of the conversation regarded the questions asked of the jury 
on voir dire (R.166). The defendant timely moved the trial court 
for mistrial because of the prejudicial effects of the conversation 
(R.168). The trial court found the conversation to be innocuous 
and denied the defendant's motion for mistrial. (R.169). 
Both the United States and the Utah Constitutions guarantee a 
criminal defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury. The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Similarly, Article I Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides for criminal trial by an impartial jury. 
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When a juror comes into contact and converses with a witness 
I 
or an officer of the court, a serious issue arises as to whether 
that juror can fulfill his duty of impartially examining evidence 
and testimony presenl ed it trial. Recognizing this fact, this 
Court, in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1984), stated: "We 
have long taken a strict approach in assuring that the constitutional 
guarantee of a fair trial iml be compromised by improper contacts 
between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel." Although 
some other jurisdictions require the defendant to show prejudice 
when such contact occurs, I his lour! rejected that position in favor 
of a more protective stand, statingthat juror contact with witnes-
ses or parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Id, 
The reasons set forth for the rebuttable presumption are twofold. 
First, it would be extremely difficult for an Appellant to prove 
how, and to what degree, a juror has in fact been influenced by contact 
with a witness. Such influence may subconsciously affect the juror's 
judgment as to credibility and therefore the mere statement from the 
juror that the contact did not affect his decision does not suffice 
to rebut the presumption of prejudice. Ici. Secondly, the judicial 
process suffers from the appearance of impropriety resulting from a 
juroi f» conversation with a witness. Participants and observers are 
left to wonder whether the defendant ted!ly received a fair trial. 
For these reasons, prejudice is presumed whenever contact goes beyond 
merely incidental, unintended, brief contact. Id.* at 280. 
Pike further makes clear Ih it the presumption of prejudice 
attaches regardless of what was actually said between the juror and 
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the witness, as long as that contact went beyond the barest, 
incidental contact. Pike 712 P.2d at 279. In Pike, the defendant's 
convictions on three counts of aggravated assault were reversed 
because of contact between a prosecution witness and jurors during 
a recess in the trial. The witness, a police officer, was asked 
by the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, about the 
conversation. The witness stated that a juror had asked him why he 
was limping. The witness testified, "I told him I had bunged my 
toe . . . and he asked me how I did that. And I told him about 
slipping in my backyard on the water and breaking . . . " (Ij3 at 279). 
At this point the trial judge interupted the testimony, and therefore 
it is unknown whether anything else was discussed. After the trial 
was over the judge questioned the jurors involved and, after the 
jurors said they were not affected by the conversation, determined 
that the conversation was harmless. This court reversed, stating: 
Due consideration for the potential and often 
unprovable tainting of a juror by contacts between 
jurors and others involved in a trial that are more 
than brief and inadvertent encounters, leads us to 
reaffirm the proposition that a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact 
during a trial between witnesses, attorneys or court 
personnel and jurors which goes beyond a mere incidental, 
unintended, and brief contact. The possibility that 
improper contacts may influence a juror in ways he or 
she may not even be able to recognize and that a defendant 
may be left with questions as to the impartiality of the 
jury, leads to the conclusion that when the contact is 
more than incidental, the burden is on the prosecution 
to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence 
the juror. 
Id. at 279. Therefore, even if the witness-juror conversation was 
unrelated to the substance of the particular trial (as was the case 
in Pike), the conversation might still unconstitutionally taint the 
trial. For this reason, the burden is put on the prosecution to 
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prove that the unauthorized contact was not prejudicial to i IK 
defendant. Because the prejudicial effects involved are as 
likely to be subconscious i conscious, mere statements by the <--> 
) 
jurors that they feel they were not affected by the ccntact does 
in 1 ififfice to meet the prosecution's burden of proof. The burden 
on the prosecutor is obviously a very difficult one to meet because 
of the grave danger of subtle psychological effects resultinu from 
juror-witness contacts. 
Factually, the case at bai presents an even more egregious situa-
tion than Pike, Like Pike, the conversation in the present case was 
largely aenetdl MI nature. Mi, Hailes told juror Lembke that he 
hoped the trial wouldn't last to< Lonq because he was planning to 
drive to Eureka, the town where the witness lived (I lb4) But un-
like the conversation in Pike, this conversation delved into the actual 
trial proceedings. Mr. Hailes told juror Lembke that he was surprised 
at the jurors' responses to questions asked of them during voir dire. 
Specifically, Jh Hailes said that had he been a juror, he would have 
responded affirmatively to the question, "W« ul 1 you believe a police-
man more than any other person," thus indicating that he felt police 
officers were more believable than the average person. (R.166). Juror 
Lembke did not respond to this comment (I 167). Another juror, 
standing with juror Lembke during the recess, also heard this conversa-
tion (F<. h» I . Just as had been the case in Pike, juror Lembke said 
that this conversation did not effect he) consideration of the case 
(R.166). The other juror present during the conversation was not 
questioned. 
- I 1 
The situation presented by the case at bar is especially 
egregious, even more so than that in Pike. In the present case, 
the conversation regarding Mr, Haile's trip to Eureka bred the same 
sense of familiarity with the jurors affected as did the police 
officer-witness1 conversation about his injured toe in Pike. 
This alone would be enough to reverse Mr. Larocco's conviction 
under Pike. But the conversation in the present case went beyond 
that in Pike in two important ways. First, Mr. Hailes's conversa-
tion went beyond the general nature of the Pike conversation. He 
spoke to the two jurors about credibility of police officers and, 
specifically, that he would believe police officers above ordinary 
citizen witnesses. Secondly, two jurors heard this conversation, 
yet only one was questioned by the judge before he decided to deny 
the motion. In Pike, all the jurors involved were questioned. There-
fore, in the case at bar, there were no assurances of impartiality 
from all affected jurors. 
In conclusion, the Appellant contends that he was denied a fair 
trial by the witness-juror conversation which occurred during a trial 
recess. The probable effects of this conversation were the subconscious 
sense of familiarity bred between the witness and the juror, and the 
conscious effect on the juror's assessment of the witness1 credibility. 
The prosecutor did not rebut the presumption of prejudice which attaches 
to such non-authorized contacts. Indeed, the present case has even 
less assurance of impartiality than Pike, because only one of the two 
affected jurors were questioned before the trial judge denied the 
Appellant's motion for mistrial. Therefore, under the protective 
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stance reiterated in State v. Pike, the Appellant fs convictions 
should be reversed. i 
POINT II 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR VIOLATED HIS 
UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE FREE 
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
Mr. Padilla, the owner of the used car lot from which the 
defendantf Mr. Larocco, was accused of stealing the Ford Mustang, 
noti fied the Sheriff's department after seeing a similar Mustang 
parked in front of the defendant's house (K.23 1). A couple of days 
later, Detective Robison went to Mr. Larocco1s house. The detective 
noted the license p] ate number and the car's description, and then 
left without trying to speak to Mr. Larocco. Using the license plate 
number, she conducted a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) search, 
which i.nccc/cunj VIN number 3F05H101968. (R.232) . She also learned 
that the plates and that VIN number were regi stered to a 1973 Ford 
Mach One Mustang, which had been purchased new in 1973 by Neal Hailes 
of Salt Lake City. The car had been registered ':o M: . Hailes through 
1985. The next registration of the car v - - *•* c f"endantf Phillip 
Larocco, in 1981 (R.233). 
Approximately one week later, on June 6, 1985, detective Robison, 
with detective Owen and Kip Ingersoll from the Department of Motor 
Vehicles, returned to Mr. Laroccofs home and again found the 1973 
Ford Mustang parked in front of the home. (R.23 4) The police officers 
looked through the windshield and saw the deist, mount > M3 VIN plaque 
which contained VIN 3F05H101968. This matched the VIN of the car 
registered to the defendant; it did not match the VIN of the car stolen 
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from the car lot. (R.235-36). Despite this fact, the police officers 
then opened the door and entered the car without a warrant. (R.235). 
(See Stipulation of Facts submitted in connection with defendant's 
motion to dismiss, Addendum "A".) After opening the door, the police 
found a different VIN, 3F05H164088, on the safety standard sticker 
located on the inside edge of the door. This VIN matched that of 
the vehicle stolen from the car lot. (R.235). No attempt was made 
to either obtain a warrant or obtain the defendant's consent before 
the car was searched. Only after the search occurred was the defendan 
approached and arrested in his home (R.238). 
Prior to trial the defendant filed a timely motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained by the police as a result of the warrantless 
search of the defendant's vehicle (R.110). That motion was denied. 
Similarily, objection was renewed at trial (R.237), thus fulfilling 
the requirements of State v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). 
A. THE DEFENDANT HAD STANDING TO RAISE THE 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE PRIOR TO TRIAL 
AND THEREFORE, AS APPELLANT HEREIN, HAS 
STANDING TO RAISE AS ERROR THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION. 
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal in nature and can be asserted only by 
one whose rights are so violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978). Similarly, this Court has held that the Utah Constitutional 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, Article 1, Section 
14, is also personal in nature and can be asserted only b/ one whose 
rights are so violated. State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
For years the issue of standing was governed by Jones v. U.S., 
362 U.S. 257 (1960), which held a defendant had "automatic standing" 
if he had been legitimately on the premises where a search had occurred. 
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The defendant did not have to be the owner of the thing searched 
if he was legitimately on the premises searched. The Jones standing 
rule was significantly altered in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978), and explicitly overruled in U.S. V. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980), In Rakas, the Court changed the inquiry from whether the 
defendant was legitimately on the premises during the offending 
search to whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the item or premises searched. Salvucci and Rawlings v. Comm. of 
Kentucky, 44 8 U.S. 98 (1980) affirmed that focus, and emphasized 
that courts should examine the "totaIity of the circumstances" when 
deciding a standing issue. 
The State may argue on appeal, as did the prosecutor r ' lie 
suppression hearing, that the Appellant, Phillip Larocco, did not have 
standing to raise the search and seizure issue at trial and therefore, 
does not have standing on appeal to complain of the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress iR.Lll) . At trial the prosecutor 
argued that Mr. Larocco did n« !; [mv.- standing to complain of the search 
of the car because Mr. Larocco stole the car (P ill). Therefore, 
the prosecutor reasoned that Mr. Larocco had no legitimate privacy . 
interest in the car. But this argument, made in the pretrial motion 
to suppress, is logically, as well as constitutionally, flawed. In 
order to find lack of standing the trial judge would have to find that 
the defendant stole the car, which was the ultimate issue of the pend-
ing case. The defendant has continuously maintained his innocence, 
arguing that he purchased the car in 1981. He produced a Utah Certi-
ficate of Title showing a Ford Mustang, VIN 3F05H101968, as belonging 
to him. Obviously, the question whether or not the defendant stole 
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the car had not yet been decided. For the trial judge to assume 
at the pretrial suppression hearing that the defendant stole the 
car would violate the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed pre-
sumption of innocence. Furthermore, prior to the illegal search, 
officers had only information that Mr. Larocco was the registered 
owner of the vehicle. 
This Court has dealt with the issue of standing to complain 
of a search of a stolen vehicle in several cases. In State v. Valdez, 
689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) and State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 
1978) , this court held that a defendant does not have standing to 
question the search of an automobile where the defendant concedes 
he does not own the automobile and cannot demonstrate a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the automobile. These two cases are 
obviously distinguishable from the case at bar. In neither of these 
cases was the ownership of the automobile at issue. The defendants 
did not claim to own the cars involved and it was clear prior to trial 
that they did not own the cars. 
A different problem arises in cases, such as the present one, 
where the defendant claims to be the bona-fide owner of the vehicle in 
question and the pending trial is to decide the issue of ownership. 
This court recognized the distinction between the present case and 
Valdez and Purcell, supra, in State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 
1966). In that case, the car searched clearly belonged to a car 
rental agency, and the defendant made no claim of ownership. This 
Court stated: 
In order for appellant to have standing to 
raise the issue of an unlawful arrest, the 
sole prerequisite is that he claim a proprie-
tary or possessory interest in the searched 
or seized property. Simpson v. United States, 
346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). In Simpson, 
supra, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals gave 
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such standing to a defendant because he claimed 
"a possessory interest in the car and his lack of 
ownership was not established until after the 
search." (emphasis ours) Here, lack of owner-
ship was established with reasonable certainty 
before the search, thus distinguishing it from 
the Simpson case* 
Therefore, it is entirely proper to require of one 
who seeks to challenge the legality of a search 
as a basis for suppressing relevant evidence that 
he alleges, and if the allegation be disputed that 
he establish, that he himself was a victim of an 
invasion of privacy. Under this philosophy, the 
appellant has no standing because he was not a 
victim of an invasion of privacy. To give a person 
standing who neither alleges nor establishes a 
proprietary nor possessory interest in the car and 
who, in fact, was without ownership therein, so 
determined before the search was made, would clearly 
be an extension beyond the scope that the constitu-
tional protection was intended to cover. 
(Emphasis added). 
Montayne, 414 P.2d at 960. Thus, consistent with the rationale of 
Montayne, in a case in which the defendant alleges ownership of a car 
and the issue of legal ownership is unsettled, the defendant has 
standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation 
in Simpson v. U.S., 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). This case was 
cited and distinguished in Montayne and, although decided prior to 
Rakas v.Illinois, supra, is directly despositive here. In Simpson, 
the government contended the defendant, who was charged with theft of 
an automobile, lacked standing because he was not the owner of the 
vehicle searched. The court explained the inconsistency of this 
contention: 
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Such a construction of the Fourth Amendment would 
totally negate the effect of the Weeks-McNabb ex-
clusionary rule in regard to automobiles. Federal 
officers could search cars at will and, of all 
defendants prosecuted for automobile theft, only those 
who actually owned the automobiles could raise Fourth 
Amendment objections successfully. Moreover, the proof 
of ownership would be sufficient to quash the prosecu-
tion for theft of the automobile. 
Simpson, 346 F.2d at 294. Many other jurisdictions follow the 
Simpson standing rule. See eg., Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 
423 (5th Cir. 1969); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 
1967); United States v. Graham, 391 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. L968); 
United States v. Golembiewski, 437 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1971); 
United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) . 
Obviously, the prosecution's standing argument would require 
a defendant to prove his innocence of the automobile theift charge 
before he would have standing to challenge the automobile search. 
But if the defendant had such proof, there would be no need to challeng 
the automobile search because the theft charges would be quashed. 
Thus, the practical effect of the prosecution's argument would be to 
strip the standing from all people accused of automobile theft, render-
ing all police searches of automobiles in such cases unchallengeable. 
In conclusion, the Appellant contends that he had standing to 
challenge the automobile search of what, he has continually contended, 
was his car. The Appellant was not required to prove his innocence 
of the underlying automobile theft charges before being granted 
standing. To so require would be to deny the defendant his presumption 
of innocence and would amount to an unconstitutional shift in the 
burden of proof from the state to the defendant. It is uncertain from 
the record whether the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion 
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to suppress was based upon a finding of lack of standing, or whether 
I 
the denial was based on the merits of the motion. Mr. Larocco 
clearly had standing to complain of the search prior to trial, and 
therefore, has standing to challenge the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress. 
B. THE WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH VIOLATED 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF TH$ UTAH CONSTI-
TUTION. 
The United States Supreme Court has constantly held that 
police may not conduct a search unless they first procure a warrant 
from a neutral magistrate. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
(1967) the Court held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished, well-delineated exceptions. The Court placed the burden on 
the party seeking an exemption from the constitutional mandate to 
prove that the circumstances of the situation made the warrantless 
search imperative. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
The Court has continually stressed that these "exceptions" are few 
and are jealously and carefully drawn. Steagald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204 (1981); Arkansas v. Saunders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
i) ENTRANCE INTO AN AUTOMOBILE TO ASCERTAIN THE 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER IS A SEARCH WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INDEPEN-
DENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, A SEARCH WITH-
IN THE MEARNING OF ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
A difference of opinion exists among courts regarding the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to vehicle searches for the 
purposes of ascertaining the vehicle identification number (VIN). 
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The minority position espoused most strongly by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, is that the entrance into and search of a vehicle 
for the purpose of ascertaining the VIN is not a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, police are free 
to enter any vehicle to ascertain the vehicle identification number 
without having a warrant or meeting the warrant exception requirements 
of the United States Constitution. United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 
644 (5th Cir. 1970). The rationale for this holding is that an 
individual can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN. 
The Polk holding had drawn sharp criticism from corrmentators 
and courts. Professor LaFave stated: 
Although this reasoning is not without some 
force, the conclusion in Polk that entry of a 
vehicle to find the VIN is no search and thus 
is not "within the scope of the Fourth Amendment11 
is unsound. That form of police surveillance, it 
is submitted, should not go totally unregulated by 
constitutional restraints, for that would mean that 
police could enter any particular car on a whim and 
that they could make wholesale entries of cars on 
nothing more than a hope that one of them mighr 
turn out to be stolen. Such surveillance intrudes 
upon a justified expectation of privavy and thus, 
as Katz v. United States teaches, is subject to 
Fourth Amendment limitations. 
LaFave, I Search and Seizure at 359-60. As Professor LaFave points 
out, under the Polk holding, the police could enter any vehicle on a 
whim, the probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment would not 
apply. 
Further problems with the Polk rationale were explained by Judge 
Godbold, dissenting, in United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 
1969) : 
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An argument can be constructed that there is 
a difference where the police invasion is to seek 
identification numbers. I. e., because identifica-
tion numbers, secret and otherwise, are for identifi-
cation purposes the citizen can have no reasonable 
expectation of their remaining private- they are for 
identification, ergo, the citizen must expect them to 
be available to the police for the purpose for which 
intended. But the function of being an identification 
device does not exempt the device itself, or the instru-
mentality it identifies, from the Fourth Amendment. In 
our increasingly complex world our motor vehicles are not 
the only things numbered for identification. So are such 
tangible effects as household appliances, lawn mowers, 
outboard motors, and even the watches on our wrists. 
Add to the list such papers and documents kept in home, 
safe deposit box or on the person, as bank checks, 
drivers1 licenses, social security cards, credit cards, 
insurance policies, securities, and deeds and mortgages, 
and the automobile registration papers often carried 
in the glove compartment of the car. All of these items 
have primary or secondary qualities of identification, 
but this does not subject them, when not in plain view, 
to being sought out by police action beyond the reach 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus with today's pervasive use of non-private identification numbers 
on private property, ranging from vehicles to household appliances 
to personal records, the Polk rationale would justify warrantless police 
entrance into homes and personal effects as well as vehicles. A real 
danger of the Polk rationale is that such entrances into private places 
will be made under the pretext of identification inspections in order 
to gain entrance where no probable cause exists for a search warrant. 
The better reasoned, and probably majority, approach is that 
followed by the Tenth Circuit. In Simpson v. U.S., 346 F.2d 291 
(10th Cir. 1965) , police suspected the defendant of having stolen the 
car he had driven to the hotel at which he was staying. The police 
went to the hotel and, upon learning that the defendant had neither 
money nor identification, arrested him for vagrancy and towed the 
vehicle to the police station. The next day, a police officer entered 
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the car and obtained a VIN. That VIN provided most of the evidence 
used against the defendant at his trial on car theft charges. The 
Simpson court held that an entrance into a car is a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the warrantless search 
of the vehicle was unlawful. The court reasoned that the car was 
the object being searched and the VIN was the object seized, stating, 
,f[t]here can be no questioning that visual observations may constitute 
the fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure and be inadmissible 
on that ground ...." Simpson, 346 F.2d at 294. 
In summary, the fact that the vehicle search was made in order 
to determine the VIN does not remove the search from the limitations 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment analysis is the same 
even where the item sought to be seized is a public document or 
record. As long as that document or record xs located in a place 
in which the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant, or a specific warrant 
exception, applies. 
ii) POLICE HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 
THE VEHICLE 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), combined with the later 
case of Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), established 
a two prong standard for probable cause. Under the Aguilar-SpineHi 
standard, probable cause requires: 
(1) Facts and information supplied by an informant 
if the informant can be shown to be reliable 
and his information credible. 
(2) Other facts and information known by the police 
officers from which they could reasonably conclude 
that a criminal activity was being carried on, or 
that evidence of a crime is where it is purported 
to be. 
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that strict compliance with 
the Aguilar-Spinelli standard is not absolutely required so long as 
the totality of the circumstances demonstrates probable cause 
(Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)), thisi Court and other courts 
continue to recognize the Aguilar-Spinelli standard as an important 
probable cause guideline. State v. Bailey, 675 E2d 1203 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, police had no probable cause to justify 
the search of the Appellant's car. After finding the car parked 
in front of the defendant's home, the police approached the vehicle 
and looked through the windshield to see the VIN on the dashboard. 
This action was legal because it did not require entrance into the 
automobile, as the dash mounted VIN can be seen from the street. This 
VIN did not match the VIN of the vehicle stolen from the car lot. 
Instead, the VIN was registered to the defendant. Furthermore, the 
dash mounted VIN appeared to be correct and did not seem to be tampered 
with. (R. 283). 
At that point police should have either continued their investiga-
tion or attempted to obtain the defendant's consent to enter the car. 
The fact that the car's VIN did not match that of the stolen car left 
the police officers without probable cause to search the car. The 
police actions in entering the car at that point were based on no 
more than a hunch. The U.S. Supreme Court has held on a number of 
occasions that hunches will not suffice where probable cause is lacking. 
See, eg., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
iii) EVEN IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED, THE SEARCH 
DID NOT MEET ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
Several carefully defined exceptions to the warrant requirement 
exist. 
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In State v. Harris, 671, P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), this Court listed 
the exceptions: 1) consent searches, 2) searches and seizures made in 
pursuit, 3) searches and seizure of contraband in areas lawfully 
accessible to the public, 4) seizure of evidence in plaLn view after 
lawful intrusion, 5) searches and seizures incident to Lawful arrest 
based on probable cause under exigent circumstances, and 6) searches 
and seizures of automobiles under exigent circumstances. Id., at 179. 
In the present case, the only exception that could possibly apply is 
the last of those listed, the "automobile exception." 
The automobile exception was first enunciated in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, police stopped a car. Police 
had probable cause to believe the car contained liquor and, after 
searching it, liquor was discovered and seized. The Appellant chal-
lenged the warrantless search of his car. The Supreme Court reasoned 
that some warrantless searches of automobiles are allowable even where 
the same search of a fixed building would violate the Fourth Amendment. 
The distinction between buildings and automobiles centers on the 
mobility of automobiles and the consequent danger that an automobile 
will be moved, thus causing the loss of evidence. The Carroll court 
held that where police have probable cause to search a moving automo-
bile which they have just stopped, they may do so without a warrant 
because of the exigencies of the situation. The exigencies found 
by the Court to justify the warrantless search were two fold. First, 
the automobile driver and passengers were put on notice of the police 
knowledge of their wrongdoing when they are stopped. Secondly, because 
of the mobility of the automobile, there would be a high probability of 
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evidence being lost or destroyed if the police were required to 
obtain a search warrant before searching or seizing the automobile. 
Thus, the Court established a limited warrant exception for automo-
biles where such exigent circumstances are present. 
The Supreme Court, since Carroll, has made it clear that the 
Carroll automobile exception is limited to situations in which ex-
igencies make it impossible or highly impractical to obtain a 
warrant. The exigencies found in Carroll to justify the warrantless 
automobile search are not present in the case at bar. In the present 
case the car was parked, not moving as in Carroll. Also distinguishing 
this case from Carroll, is the fact that the car was unoccupied, and 
that the defendant was unaware of the police investigation of him 
since contact was never made with him until his arrest. Furthermore, 
the police knew in advance the location of the car and they knew 
they would want to obtain the VIN from the car. This advance knowledge 
was not present in Carroll. 
A case dealing with the automobile exception which ijs factually 
very similar to the case at bar is Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 
443 (1971). In Coolidge, the police suspected the defendant may have 
been involved in a murder. After performing an investigation, police 
arrested the defendant in his house and seized his automobile which 
was parked in the driveway. The automobile was subsequently towed to 
the police station where it was searched and vacuumed for evidence. 
The Court held that, because police knew of the presence of the auto-
mobile and planned to seize it, no exigent circumstances existed to 
justify police failure to obtain a valid warrant, and the fruits of 
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the unconstitutional seizure of the automobile were inadmissible. 
The Court explained the factors leading to its conclusion: 
Since the police knew of the presence of 
the automobile and planned all along to seize 
itf there was no "exigent circumstance" to 
justify their failure to obtain a warrant. 
Here. . . the determining factors are advanced 
police knowledge of the existence and location 
of the evidence, police intention to seize it, 
and the ample opportunity for obtaining a warrant. 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 478, 482. The Court distinguished between a 
search of a moving vehicle which had been stopped (as ii Carroll) 
and the search of a stationary unoccupied vehicle (as in. Coolidge): 
The stopping of a vehicle on the open highway 
and a subsequent search amount to a major interfer-
ence in the lives of the occupants. Carroll held 
such an interference to be reasoncible without a 
warrant, given probable cause. It may be thought 
to follow a fortiori that the seizure and search 
here—where there was no stopping and the vehicle 
was unoccupied - were also reasonable, since the 
intrusion was less substantial, although there were 
no exigent circumstances whatever. Using reasoning 
of this sort, it is but a short step to the position 
that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a 
warrant before searching and seizing an automobile, 
provided that they have probable cause. 
If the police may, without a warrant, seize and 
search an unoccupied vehicle parked on the owrer's 
private property, not being used for any illiegal purpose, 
then it is hard to see why they need a warrant to seize 
and search a suitcase, a trunk a shopping bagr or any 
other portable container in a house, garage, cr back 
yard. 
The fundamental objection, then, to the line of 
argument adopted by Mr. Justice White in his dissent in 
this case and in Chimel v. California, supra, is that 
it proves too much. If we were to agree with Mr. Justice 
White that the police may, whenever they have probable 
cause, make a warrantless entry for the purpose of making 
an arrest, and that seizures and searches of automobiles 
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are like wise per se reasonable given probable 
cause, then by the same logic any search or 
seizure could be carried out without a warrant 
and we would simply have read the Fourth Amend-
ment out of the Constitution. 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 479-80. Thus, automobiles, like all other 
private property, are protected from warrantless search and seizure 
unless exigencies exist compelling the immediate warrantless search 
and seizure. 
Following Coolidge, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the 
distinction between moving vehicles and parked "movable" automobiles. 
In Hudson v. Texas, 588 S.W.2d 348 (Texas 1979), the court held that 
the exigency required for a valid warrantless search of an automobile 
must be one of the following: 1) that the car was moving when 
stopped or, 2) if parked and unoccupied, that the car is movable and 
that the owner is alerted that the police are investigating and that 
the car would in fact have been moved if police did not immediately 
seize it. The court stated: 
The reason we carefully distinguish beteen 
"moving" and "movable" vehicle is the readily 
apparent difference in exigencies involved. A 
car stopped on a public highway containing alerted 
occupants carries a high risk that "the car's 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must 
be obtained." Chambers v. Maroney, supra 3 99 U.S. at 
at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981. That same exigency may 
arise with an unoccupied parked car under certain 
circumstances. The Court in Cardwell decided that 
• sufficient exigent circumstances did exist for two 
reasons. First, "[h]ere, as in Chambers v. Maroney,. . 
the automobile was seized from a public place where 
access was not meaningfully restricted." Cardwell v. 
Lewis, supra 417 U.S. at 593, 94 S.Ct. at 2471. 
Second, there was evidence that the defendant "asked 
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one of his attorneys to see that his wife and family 
got the car, and that the attorney relinquished the 
keys to the police inorder to avoid a physical con-
frontation." Id. at 595, 94 S.Ct. at 2471-2472. 
Hudson, 588 S.W. 2d at 354. Hudson served to clarify the exingencies 
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583 (1974) under which a parked movable car can be seized and 
searched without a warrant. 
The present case is strikingly similar to Coolidge, supra. 
Here, as in Coolidge, police had conducted an investigation before 
seizing and searching the automobile. The defendant's :ar was parked 
at his house and was unoccupied. Police knew where the defendant 
lived and the car had been seen at that location on a number of 
previous occasions. There is no evidence indicating that the defendani 
knew the police were investigating him, nor was there any other evidenc 
that the police were compelled to immediately search the car. Indeed, 
if the police did have probable cause to search the vehicle, the 
leisurely pace of their investigation demonstrates that they had ample 
opportunity to obtain a warrant before seizing and searching the car. 
When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged, it is the prosecu-
tor's burden to demonstrate the exigent circumstances justifying it. 
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Just as in Coolidge, 
no recognized exigencies existed, and the fruit of the illegal search 
should have been suppressed. 
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POINT III 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL AND TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
WHEN JURORS SAW HIM SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY ON AT 
LEAST TWO OCCASIONS DURING TRIAL. 
After the jury had returned its verdict, the trial court 
learned that two jury members had seen things during the course of 
trial which clearly indicated that Mr. Laroccp was in custody at 
the time. One juror saw the defendant being led downstairs by a 
uniformed officer (R.328). Although the record is not clear, the 
probability is substantial that the defendant was handcuffed at the 
time. Another juror saw Mr. Larocco entering a police car. (Id..). 
The defendant moved for a mistrial (R.327). After hearing the jurors 
say they were uneffected by what they saw, Judge Dee denied the 
motion (R.329). 
InEstellev. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the United States 
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of juror prejudice arising from 
the identification of the defendant as being incarcerated. The 
Court held that trying a defendant in identifiable prison garb 
violated not only the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, but also the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection 
of the law. The Court stated: 
Similarly troubling is the fact that compelling 
the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates 
usually against only those who cannot post bail prior 
to trial. Persons who can secure release are not 
subjected to this condition. To impose the condition 
on one category of defendants, over objection, would 
be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 100 L Ed 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR2d 1055 (1956). 
Williams, 425 U.S. at 505-06. However, the Court observed that no 
-29-
fundamental rights were involved and therefore, the issue is waived 
unless a timely objection is made. 
This Court has significantly expanded the Williams rationale, 
perhaps in recognition of the fact that few, if any, rights are 
more fundamental than the right to fair trial and the right to equal 
protection of the laws. In Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980), 
this Court, agreeing with Williams, stated, "The prejudicial effect 
that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in identifiable 
prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial 
as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a crimina. 
trial." Smith, 617 P.2d at 344. However, the Court announced a more 
protective stance than that constitutionally mandated in Williams. 
First, the Court held that because basic fundamental rights are invol-
ved, a waiver cannot be presumed by the failure of defense counsel 
to object to the defendant's appearance in prison clothes. Secondly, 
this Court placed a burden on the trial judge to ascertain whether 
the defendant wished to waive his right not to appear in prison clothes 
Smith, 617 P.2d at 344-45. In so holding, this Court expressly over-
ruled Gentry v. Smith, 600 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1979), a case closely 
following Estelle v. Williams, supra, holding the objection to have 
been waived if not made at trial. Thus, although many jurisdictions 
have chosen to closely follow Estelle v. Williams, supra, this Court 
has taken a much more cautious, protective approach in recognition of 
the immeasurable, often subconscious prejudicial impact on jurors who 
identify the defendant as a jail or prison inmate. 
Regarding the use of shackles or restraining devices on the 
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defendant or a defense witness at trial, the California Supreme 
Court has continuously held, since its 1871 decision of People 
v, Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, that such devices are manifestly 
prejudicial to the defendant in the eyes of the jury and are not 
to be used except in extreme situations where a special need is 
demonstrated. The court explained its reasoning in People v. Duran, 
127 Cal Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Ca. 1976): 
We believe that it is manifest that the shack-
ling of a criminal defendant will prejudice him in 
the minds of the jurors. When a defendant is charged 
with any crime, and particularly if he is accused of 
a violent crime, his appearance before the jury in 
shackles is likely to lead the jurors to infer that 
he is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of 
the type alleged. (See Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 
U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed2d 353; Odell v. 
Hudspeth (10th Cir. 1951) 189 F.2d 300.) The removal 
of physical restraints is also desirable to assure 
that "every defendant is . . . brought before the court 
with the appearance, dignity, and self respect of a free 
and innocent man." (Eaddy v. People (1946) 115 Colo. 
488, 492, 174 P.2d 717, 719; see also Illinois v. Allen, 
supra, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351, 90 SJet. 1057, 25 L.Ed, 2d 
353 (Brennan, J. concurring); Kennedy v. Cardwell, supra, 
487 F.2d 101, 104; Helwig, Coping with the Unruly Criminal 
Defendant: The Option of the Allei> Case (1971) 7 Gonzaga 
L.Rev (17.) Finally, the United States Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that physical restraints should be used 
as a last resort not only because of the prejudice created 
in the jurors1 minds, but also because "the use of this 
technique is itself something of an affront to the very 
dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the 
judge is seeking to uphold." (Illinois v. Allen, supra, 
397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061.) 
The court then reaffirmed its rule "that a defendant cannot be sub-
jected to physical restraints of any kind . . . while in the jury's 
presence, unless there is a showing of manifest need for such restraints 
Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327. 
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In the present case, the two jurors saw the defendant shackled 
and in custody after the trial had adjourned for the lunch recess 
preceeding the jury's deliberations (R.327). The fact that the 
observations were made during an adjournment rather than during 
trial proceedings does not distinguish this case from the previously-
cited cases. Although the State may have had a legitimate security 
interest in having the defendant shackled and in custody as he was 
leaving his trial, the trial court clearly erred in allowing jurors 
to view the defendant so restrained. Even the momentary viewing 
of Mr. Larocco in custody established him as an incarcerated detainee 
in the minds of the jurors. The prejudice flowing from such momentary 
viewing is precisely the same as the situation in which the defendant 
is brought into court with prison garb or shackles on. The two jurors1 
perceptions of the defendant were thereafter tainted by their knowledge 
that the defendant was being restrained and incarcerated at the time. 
The defendant had a right to be brought before the jurors, "with the 
appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man," 
Puran, supra. 
A defendant who is able to post bail has no problem presenting 
the "appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man." 
Because such a defendant has money, he goes through trial unincarceratec 
and unfettered by shackles. But the defendant who cannot afford 
bail is subjected to shackles as well as police custody. For this 
reason, as the Supreme Court noted in Estelle v. Williams, supra juror 
identification of the defendant as an inmate may violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law as ^ell as the 
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Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial. For these reasons, 
Mr, Laroccofs convictions should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONVICT THE 
APPELLANT OF BOTH THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE AND 
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT POSSESSION OF A STOLEN 
VEHICLE IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE 
VEHICLE. 
The Appellant, Phillip Larocco, appeals from a judgment and 
conviction for Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), 
and for Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 am amended). Prior to 
trial Mr. Larocco submitted a proposed jury instruction which would 
have instructed the jurors that possession of a stolen vehicle is 
a lesser included offense of theft of an operable vehicle (R.94). 
(Addendum B). The trial court refused this instruction, instead 
instructing the jury that they could return convictions for both 
offenses (R.78). (Addendum C). The defendant objected to this 
instruction and to the court's refusal to give his proposed lesser 
included offense instruction (R.324). 
On appeal, Mr. Larocco makes two related assignments of error 
concerning these jury instructions. First, under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended), the appellant contends that he can-
not be convicted for possession of a stolen vehicle and theft of that 
same vehicle because the theft offense necessarily encompasses the 
possession offense. Secondly, Mr. Larocco contends that he was entitled 
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to an instruction on the lesser offense of possession of a stolen 
vehicle. 
A. THE APPELLANT CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTE 
THE THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AND POSSESSION 
OF THAT SAME STOLEN VEHICLE. 
Utah Code Ann §76-1-402 (3) (1953 as amended) states that ac-
cused cannot be convicted of an underlying offense and an included 
offense: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be convicted 
of both the offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged; 
One definition of included offense is an offense "established by 
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (3) 
(a) (1953 as amended). 
This Court recently reversed convictions in two cases in which 
the defendants were convicted of both underlying offenses and of 
offenses included in the underlying offense. In State \ . Hill, 674 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the defendant was convicted of theft and aggravate 
robbery. This Court held that under the circumstances of that case, 
the crime of theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. 
This Court explained that under §76-1-402 (3), "conviction of a lesser 
included offense (1) is permitted as an alternate to the charged offens-
but (2) is not permitted as an addition to it." Hill, 674 P.2d at 96. 
The Court stated that, for purposes of §76-1-402(3), the greater/lesser 
relationship must be determined by comparing the statutory elements of 
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the two crimes. Where the two crimes are such that the greater 
cannot be committed without the necessary commission of the lesser, 
then as a matter of law, the offenses stand in the relationship of 
greater and lesser offenses and the defendant cannot be convicted 
of both. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. But where one of the crimes has 
multiple variations so that the greater/lesser relationship exists 
between some variations of the crimes, but not between others, a court 
must apply a secondary test; it must look to the evidence presented 
to determine whether there is a greater/lesser relationship between 
the variations proven at trial. Id.. After examining the evidence 
presented in Hill, this court found theft to be a lesser included 
offense of the variation of aggravated robbery proven in that case. 
The remedy exercised by this Court was to reverse the lesser (theft) 
conviction and affirm the greater (aggravated robbery) conviction. 
This Court again applied the Hill approach in State v. Bradley, 
19 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Sept. 23, 1985). In that case, Mr. Bradley 
had been convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. After applying the second-
ary evidence based test of Hill, this Court concluded that aggravated 
assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated burglary 
and, therefore, the Appellant should not have been convicted of both. 
The lesser conviction, aggravated assault, was reversed and the 
sentence vacated. 
A case directly analagous to the case at bar is Shackelford v. 
State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971). In that case, the defendant committed 
an armed robbery of a pharmacy, stealing narcotics. He was later 
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apprehended and arrested. Police found the stolen narcotics in 
his automobile. The defendant was convicted of both aggravated 
robbery and possession of narcotics; he appealed, claiming a 
violation of an Oklahoma statute which states: "An act or 
omission which is made punishable in different ways by different 
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such pro-
visions, but in no case can be punished under more than one; ..." 
Title 21 O.S. Supp. §11 (1970). The Shackelford Court Followed 
the California interpretation of a similar statute, quoting the 
case of Neal v. State, 357 P.2d 839 (Ca. 1960): 
"Section 654 has been applied not only 
where there was but one 'act1 in the or-
dinary sense * * * but also where a 
course of conduct violated more than one 
statute * * *. If all of the offenses 
were incident to one objective, the de-
fendant may be punished for any one of 
such offenses but not for more than 
one." 357 P.2d at 843-844. 
The Shackelford court then held that the robbery and the possession 
both arose out of the same criminal act, and therefore, the defendant 
could only be convicted of one or the other. 
Significantly, the Shackelford court recognized that the Oklahoma 
prohibition of double convictions for the same act is broader than 
the the federal constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy: 
It is significant that this statute speaks of 
an "act or omission" while the double jeop-
ardy prohibition speaks of a conviction or 
acquittal of an "offense" as being a bar to 
another prosecution for the same "offense." 
If an "act" violates two different laws, it 
may be two "offenses under double jeopardy 
interpretation, but Section II prohibits a 
single act being punished more than once under 
different statutes. 
-36-
Shackelford, 481 P.2d at 165. The same reasoning likewise applies 
to the double conviction prohibition of Utah CQde Annotated §76-1-402 
(3) (1953 as amended). A single act might violate two separate 
offenses as defined by the state legislature, and therefore, techni-
cally escape the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition; however, 
§76-1-402(3) still prohibits the two convictions where the lesser 
offense arises out of the greater offense. Therefore, §76-1-402(3) 
is independent of, and broader than, the Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy prohibition. 
Courts examining the issue of double convictions have almost 
unanimously followed the Shackelford court in holding that a defendant 
cannot be convicted of both theft (or robbery or larceny) and 
possession (or receiving or retaining) of the same stolen property. 
See E.g., Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App. 1981); Pierce v. 
State, 627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981); People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d 741 
(Colo. 1981); State v. Alvarez,678 P.2d 1132 (Kan. App. 1984); State 
v. Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984); State v. Smith, 670 P.2d 963 
(N.M. App. 1983); State v. Richards,621 P.2d 165 (Wash. App. 1980); 
People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976); State v. McPherson, 
444 P.2d 5 (Or. 1968). 
In the present case, Mr. Larocco was convicted of theft of an 
operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and of possession of 
a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony. Both convictions related 
to the same vehicle, a 1973 Ford Mustang. The Appellant contends that 
he could not be convicted of both offenses because the elements of 
possession of a stolen vehicle are necessarily included in those of 
theft of an operable motor vehicle. 
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Utah Code Annotated §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), lists the 
elements of theftf the greater offense in this case: 
Theft —Elements. — A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Because the theft was of an operable motor vehicle, the offense is 
a second degree felony. U.C.A. §76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as amended) . 
Utah Code Annotated §41-1-112 proscribes possession of a stolen vehicle 
Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle a 
felony. Any person who ... 
has in his possession any vehicle which he knows 
or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlaw-
fully taken, and who is not an officer of the law 
engaged at the time in the performance of his duty 
as such officer, is guilty of a felony. 
By definition, theft contains two elements: 1) obtaining 
or exercising unauthorized control over the property of another, 
2) with a purpose to deprive him thereof. Possessing a stolen vehicle 
also contains two elements: 1) possessing a vehicle, and 2) the 
possessor knowing or having reason to believe that it was stolen. 
Both of the elements of possession of a stolen vehicle are necessarily 
included in the first element of theft. Under the interpretation 
given by the trial court, every theft would give rise to both a theft 
conviction and a possession of stolen property conviction. Conviction 
of both violates the Fifth Amendment prohibition of double jeopardy 
and/or the broader prohibition of double convictions contained in 
U.C.A. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended). 
For this reason, Phillip Larocco requests this Court to reverse 
the lesser conviction (possession of a stolen vehicle) and vacate its 
sentence. Additionally, Appellant contends (see subpoint B, below) 
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that he was entitled to an instruction on possession of a stolen 
vehicle as a lesser offense of the theft count, and that the trial 
court's refusal to so instruct the jury constituted reversible error, 
mandating a remand of the theft conviction for retrial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT POSSESSION OF 
A STOLEN VEHICLE IS A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE VEHICLE. 
The importance to an accused of instructions regarding lesser 
included offenses has been elaborated on in many cases. A recent 
Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), 
dealt with a situation in which the appellant (Baker) was convicted 
of burglary. He appealed, claiming error in the court's refusal to 
instruct on the offense of criminal trespass. This Court, in emphas-
izing the importance of instructions on lesser included offenses 
quoted from Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382 (1980); 
[I]t has long been recognized that [the 
lesser included offense] can also h^e beneficial 
to the defendant because it affords the jury 
a less drastic alternative than th^ choice 
between conviction of the offense Charged and 
acquittal. State v. Baker, supra, 156 
The defendant is entitled to such instructions as a benefit of the 
reasonable doubt standard. This Court then quoted from Keeble v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13,93 S.Ct. 1993,1997-98 (1973): 
Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's 
demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense 
to argue that a defendant may be better off without 
such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has 
not established beyond a reasonable doubt every 
element of the offense charged, and if no lesser 
offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a 
theoretical matter, return a verdi|ct of acquittal. 
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But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense 
instruction— precisely because he should not 
be exposed to the substantial risk that the 
jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where 
one of the elements of the offense charged remains 
in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of 
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its 
doubts in favor of conviction. State v. Baker, 
supra, 156-57. 
The importance of such lesser offense instructions to a defendant 
is clear. But they are also important to society as a whole, because 
such instructions give the jury a choice of convicting the defendant 
of a lesser offense rather than simply acquitting him if the prosec-
utor fails to prove all the elements of the offense charged, but does 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of a lesser included 
offense. 
The test given to determine if one offense is a lesser included 
offense of another is that found in the Utah Criminal Code. Utah 
Code Annotated &76-l-402(3) (1953 as amended) provides in pertinent 
part: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of 
both the offense charged and the included offeise. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to estciblish the com-
mission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, con-
spiracy, or form or preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by the statute as 
a lesser included offense. 
In State v. Baker, supra, this Court clarified much of the 
confusion which had existed regarding whether to apply the "necessarily 
included offense" doctrine or an evidence-based analysis in considering 
what constitutes a lesser included offense and when a jury should be 
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instructed on a lesser included offense. The "necessarily included 
offense" doctrine, the stricter of the two standards, applies only 
when it is the prosecutor seeking the instruction on the lesser 
included offense. But when it is the defendant who requests the 
instruction, an evidence-based analysis is employed, for the reasons 
quoted above in Beck v. Alabama, supra, and Keeble v. United States, 
supra. 
In State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984), this Court, relying 
on State v. Baker, supra, held that the appellant, Mr. Brown, who 
who was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, was entitled to an instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense of assault. This court stated: 
When it is the defendant, however, who requests the 
instruction, we held in Baker that an evidence-based 
analysis must be used in order to afford the accused 
the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. 
We determined that requirements must be met under our 
statutory system in order for the defendant to be 
entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense. First, 
the statutory elements of the offenses must be related 
in some way; there must be some overlap in the defini-
tions of the two crimes, even though th^y need not meet 
the totally "included" standard. This Comparison of 
the statutory elements helps in determining whether an 
offense is an "included offense" under §76-1-402(3)(a), 
which provides that an offense is included when "[i]t 
is established by proof of the same or less than all 
the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense cahrged." Second, we held that the court must 
instruct on the lesser offense only if there is some 
evidence at trial that, if believed by the jury, would 
provide a "rational basis for a verdict of acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him 
of the included offense." U.C.A., 1953, §76-1-402(4). 
Brown, supra, at 589. 
The first step in the evidence-based analysis is a comparison 
of the statutory elements of the offense of which the Appellant 
was convicted, theft, with the elements of iphe lesser offense on 
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which the Appellant requested the jury be instructed, possession 
of a stolen vehicle. As discussed in subpoint A, above, theft 
consists of two elements: 1) obtaining or exercising unauthorized 
control over the property of another, 2) with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. (U.C.A. §76-6-404). Possession of a stolen vehicle 
also consists of two elements: 1) possessing a vehicle, which 
2) the possessor knows or has reason to believe was stolen. (U.C.A. 
§41-1-12). As discussed in subpoint A, above, both elements of 
possession of a stolen vehicle are necessarily contained within 
the first element of theft. Although the Appellant merely has the 
burden to show some overlap of the elements of the crimes (Brown, 
supra,) it is clear that every possession of a stolen vehicle is an 
"exercise [of] unauthorized control over the property of another," 
and is therefore, necessarily a lesser included offense of theft. 
The second step in the evidence-based analysis requires consider-
ation of whether some evidence was presented at trial which, if believed 
by the jury, would provide a rational basis for acquitting the defendan 
of the greater offense and convicting on the lesser included offense. 
Brown, supra. Such a rational basis clearly exists in the case at 
bar. Significant problems concerning identification are found in the 
testimony of David Luce, the used car salesman who identified the 
Appellant as being the person who test drove the car but never returned 
it. Mr. Luce had described the person who stole the car as being 
5f8"-5f10" in height and weighing 160-165 pounds (R.202), which was 
approximately Mr. Luce's size. But at trial defense couns;el pointed 
out to the jury the obvious fact that Phillip Larocco is a tall, very 
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heavy set man (R.310). Although the record does not make clear 
exactly how tall he is nor how much Mr. Larocco weighs, his sister, 
Paula Bone, testified that the defendant wore a size extra-extra-
large shirt and that it was very difficult to find pants large 
enough for him (R.291). Furthermore, both Ms. Bone and Darrel 
Norman, the Appellant's brother-in-law, testified that Mr. Larocco 
was at least as heavy in 1981 (at the time the car was stolen), 
as he was at trial (R.290,295). 
The weak identification weighed against the theft charge, but 
had no bearing on the possession of a stolen motor vehicle charge. 
Mr. Luce's testimony was the only evidence that Mr. Larocco stole 
the vehicle. Therefore, the very innacurate identification of the 
Appellant provided a rational basis for acquitting the Appellant of 
theft but still convicting him of possession of a stolen vehicle. 
The Appellant does not bear the burden of showing that such an outcome 
was likely; Appellant need only demonstrate a rational basis for such 
action, in keeping with this Court's recognition that lesser included 
offense instructions should be liberally available to defendants where 
a possibility exists that the jury might choose to convict of a lesser 
offense (Baker, Brown, supra). The evidence in this case presented 
such a possibility. 
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CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Phillip Lorocco, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and 
remand his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the 
charges, or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 day of July, 19 86. 
LISA J. &EMAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
PRETRIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Salt Lak<=- r;n;inty attorney 
CPh?IGwrn^ C , HOFTON ,11 
Deputy COUP.ty At1.ornfiy 
231 F^st ^00 Fouth, Third Floor 
Salt M k e City, Utah P4111 
Tel^nhonet 3 6 3-7900 
IW IHF DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMP FOR SALT LAKF COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THR STATE OF UTAH, ) STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
owrvLT* ?AUL T.APOCCO, ) Criminal No. CR 85-742 
Judge David B. Dee 
De f e n d a n t. ) 
The State of Utah, by and through Creighton C. 
fir>>^ onr T i , a^fi the Defendant, by and through his counsel 
T\?a Pf--r^ -Lf hereby stipulate to the following facts for pur-
pr-^ t?? ov the Defendants Motion to Suppress: 
In June of 1981r a 1973 Ford Mustang (Vin #3F05H164 
OP.P.) ^V:noc\. by Will lap Pa.dilla v/as stolen from his car lot, Stace 
Auto Sal^s, 41*7 Q 0 # state Street, by a nan who took the car 
for a t — t drive and n^ver returned it. The salesman assisting 
ti'-p ran was Dr>vp Luce, Luce nad seen the man several tines 
T^ior to the t e ^ drive and later described him to the police as 
resenh» Log Don Oelouise, the actor. Wnen the man failed to 
w 3 J * • r. * r r* ~ > • 
By 
!/ 
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return the vehicle or pay for it, Mr. Padilla reported the 
theft to the no lice. 
Nearly four years later, in May of 1985, Dave Luce, 
row a salesman por Valley Ford, recognized the Defendant, who 
had C^ "VT»P into test drive another Ford Mustang, as the same 
T"?.n who had absconded with Padilla fs car in 1981. Luce 
obtained information from a fellow.salesman, Patrick Sullivan, 
who was assisting the Defendant. Defendant had given his 
name as Phillip Wilson and his address as 7442 Gardenia Ave. 
At that time n<?fen<iant appeared to be on foot, out 2 or 3 
days later luce noticed the Defendant driving a Mustang which 
appeared to hir to be the same vehicle stolen from Padilla's 
lot in 1981. Luce called Padilla and conveyed to him che 
above information, which Padilla later passed on to Linda 
''"•b:son of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
After receiving the call from Luce, Padilla went to 
the vicinity of 7442 Gardenia Ave, and although there was no 
such andress, he located his vehicle parked in front of the 
residence at 724 2 Gardenia Ave. He recognized the car not 
only f>om its genera] appearance, out from a repaired interior 
r]o^'' pa^e]. which his shop had worked
 von back in 1981 prior to 
offrrinq the car Tor sale. Padilla called the police. He 
Stipulation of Facts 
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did not see or speak to the Defendant. 
After receiving the call, Detective Robison went to 
the vicinity and located the vehicle parked in front of 
Defendant ' s residence at 7242 Gardenia Ave. She noted the 
license number of the car, its description, and the address, 
an^> left without further approaching the vehicle or the 
residence at that tire. She conducted, further investigation 
by running the plat-,'; number and receiving back an associated 
VTN number {3F05H10]968). *A VIN search through the Department 
of Motor Vehicles revealed that the car which was originally 
registered under such number, a 1973 Mach One Ford Mustang, 
vas purchased new in 197 3 by Neal Hailes of Salt Lake City. 
It was registered to Hailes through 1975. The next registra-
tion entry for such VIN number was to the Defendant in 1981. 
Approximately one week after first seeing the 
vehicle, Detective Robison returned to Defendant's address 
anri saw the vehicle parked in front of his residence. Kip 
IngersoJ.l from the Division of Motor Vehicles also responded 
to the scene. The police looked through the windshield and 
saw * vi KI number, 3F05H101968, which did not match the VIN of 
the v?hide which had been stolen from Padilla in 1981. The 
police opened the unlocked driver's door and checked the 
S f .1 p u 1 n t i o n oft ^ a c t s 
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safety standard sticker located thereon. There they located 
the reportedly stolen car's VIN, 3F05H164088. At the time 
they opened th« door to check the identification sticker, 
they did not have a warrant, nor had they contacted the 
Defendant or anyone at his residence to notify h:.m of the 
car's inspection or that he was a suspect in an auto theft. 
After finding the VIN number of the stolen car 
inside the door panel, the police contacted Defendant at his 
residence. He acknowledged, after Miranda, his possession of 
t h e "eh i r.. i P
 r telling them that he owned it, having purchase 
it" from Creator Chevrolet in the summer of 1981. He sub-
sequently produced B title to the venicle, bearing the date 
ot: p_T_o-*l ?.nd a vi!* number of 3F05H101968. The police 
arrested the Defendant on the instant charges. 
After impounding the vehicle, Kip Ingersoll of the 
Division of Motor Vehicles also located another VIN number on 
the car's frame confirming in to be Padilla's vehicle (3F05H16^ 
0R Q). Thprp^ftpr they checked the VIN tag on the dashboard 
( 3rn^H] 0] qr»R > apH found that it had been glued on rather than 
rivited, Subsequent investigation revealed that the vehicle 
originally registered to Neal Hailes with that VIN number had 
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been totalled in a car wreck in December of 1975. 
Respectfully submitted this fp" day of August 
1 oqc, 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON, II 
Deputy County Attorney 
LISA REMAW 
Attorney for Defendant 
V ; - - ^ ••" '* -
ADDENDUM B 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED LESSER-INCLUDED INSTRUCTION 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
When you retire to consider your verdicts, you will select 
one of your members to act as foreperson who will preside over your 
deliberat ions. 
Your verdicts in this case must be either: 
Guilty of THEFT es charged in Count I of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count I, THEFT; 
And/Or 
Guilty of POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE as charged in 
Count II cf the Information; or 
Net Guilty of Count II, P08ESSI0N OF A STOLEN VEHICLE; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concrrence of 
all jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdicts must be 
in writing and when found, must be signed and dated by your fore-
person and then returned by you to this court. When your verdicts 
have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to report 
to the Court. 
Dated a t Salt Lake City, Utah v ^ / ^ g . / ^ ff %5> 
7^ 
JUDGE 
H. DiXON MEDLEY 
r^r, CLE^K , 
Deouty Clerk y 
ADDENDUM C 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^_ 
If the State has failed to convince you beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the existence of all of the elements of 
the offense of Auto Theft, you may consider whether the 
Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. Before you can find PHILLIP 
LAROCCO guilty of the crime of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, 
the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about the 6th day of June, 1985, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO had in 
his possession a motor vehicle that had been stolen or unlawfally 
taken. 
2. That PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO knew or had reason to 
believe the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken. 
3. Tnat the Defendant was not an officer of the lav; 
engaged at that time in the performance of his duty as such an 
officer. 
If you believe that the evidence established each and 
all of these essential elements of the offense beyond a resonable 
doubt, it is you duty to convict the Defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of 
said elements, then you should find the pefendant Not Cuilty. 
